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Taking on racial segregation: the European Court
of Human Rights at a Brown v. Board of
Education moment?
Dr. M.E.A. Goodwin*
On 13th November 2007, the European Court of Human
Rights gave final judgement in the case of D.H. and
Others v. Czech Republic.1 As was widely anticipated,
the Grand Chamber overturned the decision of the Sec-
ond Section Chamber, and found by a 13-4 majority that
the well-documented practice in the Czech Republic of
assigning Romani children to so-called ‘special schools’
for children with mental deficiencies does in fact consti-
tute a violation of Article 14 (the right to non-discrimina-
tion) in conjunction with Article 2 Protocol 1 (the right
to education) of the Convention. In doing so, the Court
appeared to have at last ceased to drag its feet in the area
of non-discrimination and fully aligned itself with a
progressive European normative framework that owes
more to Luxembourg than Strasbourg.
A year further on, the Court has had further opportunity
to focus minds upon the continuing existence within both
the Council of Europe and the European Union of racial
segregation in access to education, notably in Oršuš and
others v. Croatia and Sampanis and others v. Greece.
Does this jurisprudence add up to a decisive moment in
European non-discrimination laws? Have we in Europe,
more than 50 years after the most famous of American
legal civil rights victories, at last reached our Brown v.
Board of Education moment?
The question is important for a number of reasons.
Firstly, it is important in terms of acknowledging the
societal responsibility we bear towards a group that has
been persecuted, misunderstood and maligned and to
move towards achieving meaningful equality in access to
education. Secondly, one could also argue that this case
and what it reflects touches upon something fundamental
of who we perceive ourselves to be, both as nationals
belonging to an inter-governmental system and as Euro-
peans (whatever that might mean) i.e. the issue of
whether or not we are willing, via the mouthpiece of the
Strasbourg Court, to tolerate and implicitly endorse racial
segregation is important for what it says about us, in a
similar way that Brown v. Board of Education and other
steps in the U.S. civil rights movement said something
fundamental about what America stood for. Thirdly,
more practically, this case touches upon the divergence
in the European normative framework between Luxem-
bourg and Strasbourg that the Chamber decision of D.H.
and Others v. Czech Republic made so clear. While the
European Court of Human Rights has explicitly recog-
nised the sheer affront to human dignity represented by
racial discrimination,2 in the case of D.H. and Others,
the Chamber chose to endorse a practice that clearly
discriminated against Romani children in outcome if not
in design. Finally, the link between treating children dif-
ferently according to ability or need and separation on
racial lines that these cases touch upon is an issue that
affects all education systems, and is not one confined to
Central Eastern Europe and the Balkans, nor to one
particular ethnic group.
This comment will consider the Grand Chamber’s rea-
soning in D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic and
attempt to assess this case in the light of earlier and sub-
sequent jurisprudence. Does this case mark a turning
point for the Court in its attitude to Article 14 or does it
in fact form part of a pattern with earlier jurisprudence,
the Chamber decision being then an aberrant verdict that
has now been corrected? Have more recent judgments
on the education of Romani children in Croatia and
Greece seen the Court uphold or even further its verdict?
It will consider the Court’s decisions and reasoning in
light of the historic 1954 US Supreme Court ruling.
1. Brown v. Board of Education
Before turning to examine the Strasbourg jurisprudence,
it is worth recalling what it was that made the 1954 case
of such momentous importance. Admittedly, the signifi-
cance of Brown can be, and frequently has been, over-
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Grand Chamber Judgement of 13 November 2007, Application No. 57325/00.1.
As early as 1973, the Court recognised the special nature of racial discrimination in finding that direct racial discrimination could fall under
Article 3 of the Convention and hence constitute inhuman and degrading treatment in the East African Asians case. More recently in Na-
2.
chova and others v. Bulgaria, the Grand Chamber stressed the ‘particular affront to human dignity’ of racial discrimination; judgment 26
February 2004.
93Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn THEMIS 2009-3
ARTIKEL
stated.3 But what this seminal case achieved was a clear
and unequivocal statement by the Supreme Court of the
evils of racial segregation. In the context of the Jim Crow
laws that enforced the principle of ‘separate but equal’
laid down in Plessy v. Ferguson,4 the Supreme Court ruled
in the context of the 14th amendment claim that separate
could never be equal. This total volte face overturning
their earlier precedent saw the Court find for the first
time that segregation itself was injustice, and in doing so
laid the path for segregation in all walks of life to be
challenged, such as public transport, housing and access
to public spaces.
In coming to this conclusion, Chief Justice Warren, in
delivering the opinion of the Court in Brown, pro-
nounced that, ‘To separate them [children] from others
of similar age and qualifications solely because of their
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in
a way unlikely ever to be undone.’ In coming to this
finding, the Court built on earlier considerations of the
substantive content of an equal education. In Brown and
in the series of cases leading up to it, the Court showed
itself willing to rely upon intangibles when comparing
facilities and in giving substantive content to quality in
education. The Court noted in Brown that ‘it [education]
is a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural
values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environ-
ment.’ Similarly, in the earlier case of Sweatt v. Painter,
the Court had ruled that it is ‘those qualities which are
incapable of objective measurement … which make for
greatness in a law school’, therefore finding that the sepa-
rate law faculties provided by Texas could not be consid-
ered as equivalent. In McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Re-
gents, referred to by Warren in Brown, the Court, in
considering the content of equal treatment, noted the
importance of the applicant’s ‘ability to study, to engage
in discussions and exchange views with other students’.5
For the Court, such considerations as those mentioned
in McLaurin had an even greater impact upon children
than young people.
While the Brown ruling opened the way for challenging
segregation in other areas of life, the motivation behind
the preparation of this case and the centrality which it
held in the civil rights movement’s strategy owes as much
to the subject matter as to what it was challenging: educa-
tion. The struggle for equal access to education was seen
by generations of early civil rights activists as the key to
achieving greater economic and political power, and thus
equality in society.6 It was understood within the move-
ment that a denial of equal education was a deliberate
means of perpetuating subjugation and of denying the
emancipation from slavery that had been achieved on
paper. Further, injustice in access to an equal education
has an impact throughout the whole life of the individual
children affected, in a way that facing discrimination in
access to public spaces or housing does not. For both
these systemic and individual reasons, education formed
the focus of the civil rights litigation strategy. Indeed, the
Court had already shown itself willing to protect equal
opportunity in education in earlier decisions.7
In Brown, the Court made a profound statement about
the importance of education in contemporary life that is
worth recalling. On behalf of the full Court, Warren
stated that, ‘Today, education is perhaps the most impor-
tant function of state and local governments. Compulsory
school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the im-
portance of education to our democratic society.’ He
continued, ‘It is the very foundation of good citizenship.’
Moreover, Chief Justice Warren went on to consider the
impact upon the individual child. He ruled, ‘it is doubtful
that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education.’
It is both elements of Brown v. Board of Education –
segregation as injustice and the sheer importance of edu-
cation in achieving equality between groups in society
and for individuals in making the most of themselves –
that mark this case as one of the most seminal in twentieth
century legal history. It was this that activists within the
nascent Romani civil rights movement were hoping to
replicate with D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic. Re-
gardless of the success of the ruling in leading to de facto
de-segregation, as the Supreme Court itself noted in
Brown, one should not underestimate the importance of
the law’s refusal to give or lend legitimacy to segregation.
Brown is remembered as much for its powerful moral
statement as for any practical consequences that flowed
from it.
Before turning to what the European Court of Human
Rights chose to make of the opportunity to deny segre-
gation that legitimacy, it is perhaps helpful to consider
the jurisprudential context in which this Court had to
rule.
2. The Strasbourg approach to non-discrimination
The European Court of Human Right’s approach to non-
discrimination and thus to Article 14 of the Convention
For criticisms levelled at the over-emphasis on the importance of the legal strategy and its failure to address de facto segregation, see
Stephen C. Halpern, On the Limits of the Law. The Ironic Legacy of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (The John Hopkins University
3.
Press, 1995); for a negative comparison with the Romani civil rights approach, see M.E.A. Goodwin, ‘White Knights on Chargers: Using
the US Approach to Promote Romani Rights in Europe?’, (2004) 5 German Law Journal 1431.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).4.
347 U.S. 483, 494.5.
Halpern, On the Limits of the Law, 7-9.6.
In State of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada (305 U.S. 337 (1938)), the Supreme Court had ruled that the refusal by the State of Missouri
to admit a black man to the public law school where no equivalent facility existed for African-Americans was available in-State was un-
7.
constitutional; and in Sweatt v. Painter (339 U.S. 629 (1948)), it ruled that Texas had failed to provide equal educational opportunities
because the whites-only law school was ruled to be a better facility, despite the $3 million upgrade to the separate black facility.
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can be characterised at best as grudging.8 In contrast to
other areas or rights under their purvey, and even taking
the natural cautiousness of the institution into account,
the Strasbourg Court has continually placed itself and its
jurisprudence behind developments in non-discrimination
law at the Member State, international and European
Community level.9
Although the Court had shown itself willing to recognise
the awfulness of racial discrimination as early as 1973 by
placing such discrimination within the ambit of Article
3 (inhuman and degrading treatment),10 it took the Court
until 2001 to accept the existence of indirect discrimina-
tion, in Hugh Jordan v. the UK.11 Having recognised the
existence of indirect discrimination, it then ruled out the
use of statistics as a means of deducing the existence of
indirect or disparate impact discrimination, despite the
fact that the European Court of Justice has been allowing
statistics to provide evidence of indirect gender discrimi-
nation since 1988.12 It did relent slightly in Hoogendijk
v. the Netherlands, but this was an admissibility decision
and allowed only statistics that were ‘undisputed’ and
‘official’ to provide evidence of a difference in treatment.13
Similarly, the Court first considered the possibility of a
shift in the burden of proof in the non-discrimination
context in Nachova v. Bulgaria in 2004,14 long after it
was standard practice both at the national level of Euro-
pean member states but also, again, within the jurispru-
dence of the ECJ;15 even then, the Grand Chamber ruling
of 2005 overturned the substantive violation of Article 2
in conjunction with Article 14 on the basis that it was
unreasonable to expect a government to disprove allega-
tions that a violent act was motivated by racial prejudice.
Instead the Grand Chamber issued a tepid statement that
it could not exclude the possibility that it might require
governments to disprove allegations of discrimination
under certain circumstances.16
This analytical approach was affirmed in Bekos and
Koutropoulos v. Greece,17 in which Greece was found
inter alia to have violated Article 14 in conjunction with
Article 3 for the police beating suffered by two Romani
men. Again the Court was only willing to offer a proce-
dural violation for the failure to investigate adequately
the allegation of racist motivation for the conduct and
not a substantive finding of racist conduct. However, the
concurring opinions, including one from Chamber Presi-
dent Bratza, suggested that there were those on the Court
who were not impressed by the majority’s timid ap-
proach.
The Court’s hesitation in looking favourably upon non-
discrimination applications is epitomised by the series of
cases relating to Gypsy families and the restrictive UK
land planning laws. Although it found in Buckley v. the
UK18 that Gypsies following a traditional way of life had
special needs, much to the delight of human rights advo-
cates, it was not willing to actually find a breach of Article
8 or Article 14 in relation to the application of the UK’s
unfair planning laws. Subsequent test cases have met with
a similar response: an acknowledgement of the special
position of Gypsy families and the responsibility of the
State to take special measures to meet their needs – going
so far as to establish a positive obligation under Article
8 to facilitate the Gypsy way of life19 – but a refusal to
accept that failure to do so breaches the Convention, even
where the local authorities have themselves breached their
statutory obligation to provide stopping facilities. The
one successful application, Connors v. the UK,20 con-
cerned a procedural matter under Article 8, following the
summary eviction of Mr. Connors and his family from
a Council owned caravan site.
For an excellent guide to the Court’s traditional approach to Article 14, see Janneke Gerards, ‘The Application of Article 14 ECHR by
the European Court of Human Rights’, in Jan Niessen and Isabelle Chopin (eds.), The Development of Legal Instrumentsto Combat
Racism in a Diverse Europe (Brill, 2004), 3-60.
8.
The principle of non-discrimination forms the bedrock of the UN human rights system; see, for example, the comprehensive definition
and far-reaching obligations contained in the 1966 UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
9.
Similarly, the principle of equality is deeply embedded in EC and EU law; see G. More, ‘The Principle of Equal Treatment: from Market
Unifier to Fundamental Right?’ in P. Craig and G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, 1999); also C. McCrudden, ‘Interna-
tional and European Norms Regarding National Legal Remedies for Racial Inequality’ in S. Fredman (ed.), Discrimination and Human
Rights – the case of racism (OUP, 2001).
Op. cit., n. 2.10.
Hugh Jordan, judgement of 4 May 2001, (2003) 37 EHRR 2. Cf. the US Supreme Court’s recognition of ‘disparate impact’ discrimination
in 1971 in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 IS 424; at the EC level, see Württembergische Milchverwertung-Südmilch AG v. Salvatore
11.
Ugliola (Case 15/69) [1969] ECR 363 and Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost (Case 152/73) [1974] ECR 153. See also Marianne Gijzen, Selected
Issues in Equal Treatment Law: A multi-layered comparison of European, English and Dutch law (Intersentia, 2006). For the argument
that the concept emerged in international law in the inter-bellum period, see C. Tobler, Indirect Discrimination. A Case Study into the
Development of the Legal Concept of Indirect Discrimination under EC Law (Intersentia, 2005).
The ECJ had recognised the concept of indirect discrimination in the Sabbatini case in 1971 (Case 32/71 Sabbatini [1972] ECR 345) and
the necessity of statistics in proving it in Danfoss (Case 109/88 Handels- og Kontorfunktionærernes Forbund I Danmark v Dansk Arbejds-
giverforening, acting on behalf of Danfoss [1989] ECR 03199.
12.
Hoogendijk v. the Netherlands, decision of 6 January 2005, Application No. 58641/00.13.
Nachova v. Bulgaria, judgment of 26 February 2004.14.
See Case 170/84 Bilka-Kaufhaus [1986] ECR 1607.15.
Nachova v. Bulgaria, Grand Chamber judgment 6 July 2005.16.
Bekos and Koutropoulos v. Greece [2005] ECHR 840; see also A. Mowbray, Cases and Materials on the European Convention on Human
Rights (OUP, 2nd ed. 2007), 827-828 for commentary on the cases.
17.
Buckley v. the UK, judgment of 25 September 1996, Reports 1996-IV.18.
Chapman v. the UK, judgment of 21 January 2001, para. 95.19.
Connors v. the UK, judgment of 27 May 2004.20.
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And yet in another sense the Strasbourg Court has shown
itself to be unusually receptive to complaints from Roma
in the last 10 years, suggesting a particular sensitivity to
the enormity of the difficulties and discrimination that
members of these communities face. Indeed, the Stras-
bourg Court is celebrated for its series of Romani cases,
with victory in each case encouraging ever more applica-
tions.21 Success began for the institution driving the cases
– the European Roma Rights Center – with Assenov v.
Bulgaria,22 a case concerning the ill-treatment of a young
Rom in police custody. Other victories were chalked up
in Conka v. Belgium,23 involving the illegal expulsion of
Roma,the already-mentioned Nachova v. Bulgaria, con-
cerning the almost certainly racially-motivated murder
of two young Romani conscript soldiers, and in Moldo-
van and Others v. Romania,24 a case relating to the
Hădăreni pogrom made famous by the film Gadjo Dilo
and Isabella Fonseca’s novel, Bury Me Standing.25 While
these victories are rightly celebrated and have brought
widespread attention to the plight of Romani communi-
ties across Europe, unlike the cases involving UK plan-
ning law or, indeed, that of D.H. and Others v. Czech
Republic, these victories concerned cases that were out-
side the everyday experience of Roma. Although one
could argue that abuse by both the police and the public,
and the culpable neglect of the authorities, with which
these cases dealt stemmed from the discriminatory envi-
ronment in which Roma live, the actual events under
examination were themselves not a part of systemic dis-
crimination, an institutionalised and officially sanctioned
part of the everyday in a way that planning laws and the
education system are.
Moreover, the issue of segregation is not one with which
the European post-war legal systems has dealt, presum-
ably on the basis that there has been no need to do so or
that, if indeed necessary, it could be addressed by either
direct or indirect discrimination depending upon the na-
ture of the cause. This lack is visible in the much-noted
failure to include mention of segregation in the EC Race
Directive,26 and the subsequent efforts to galvanise sup-
port for a ‘Romani Directive’, in which the prohibition
of segregation and appropriate measures to tackle it could
be included.27 This failure to mention the s-word arguably
means that Europe is ill-placed to meet not just the chal-
lenges that the extreme marginalisation of Europe’s Ro-
mani communities raise but also broader issues of institu-
tional reactions to our multicultural societies.28
Following in this trend, segregation was barely mentioned
by the Strasbourg Court in the case that forced it to
consider systemic racial discrimination beyond the setting
of UK planning laws and in the much more emotive area
of children and the right to education. D.H. and Others
was set up as a direct counter-part to Brown v. Board of
Education,29 with the caveat that this case was based not
upon clear de jure segregation along racial lines but upon
the de facto segregation into schools for the mentally-
disabled in a system where separate was anything but
equal.
3. Endorsing segregation? D.H. and Others
3.1. The Facts of the case
This case, also known as the Ostrava case after the Czech
town that forms its backdrop, concerns the challenge by
eighteen Romani children born between 1985 and 1991
of their placement in a ‘special school’. Under the terms
of the relevant Czech legislation – section 31(1) of the
Schools Act 198430 and Article 2(4) of Decree no.
127/199431 – special schools exist for the education of
children with ‘mental deficiencies’ that prevent them from
following the curriculum of the ordinary schooling sys-
tem. The applicants alleged that placement in these
schools denied them their right to education on an equal
footing with non-Romani children, and, as such, was ra-
cially discriminatory in impact.
The crux of their case was that as a result of question-
naires sent by the European Roma Rights Center – a pro-
Romani organisation based in Budapest – to the head-
teachers of all schools in Ostrava, it was possible to estab-
lish, on the basis of their replies, that 50.3% of all Romani
children in the town attended a special school, despite
only constituting 5% of the town’s overall school popu-
lation. In comparison, only 1.8% of non-Romani children
had been placed in a special school. As a consequence of
these statistics, it was possible to calculate that any given
Romani child was 27 times more likely to be labelled as
having ‘mental deficiencies’ and placed outside the normal
school system.
See Luke Clements, ‘The Strasbourg Cases and Their Likely Long-Term Impact’, (2006) 2/3 Romani Rights.21.
Assenov v. Bulgaria [1998] ECHR 98.22.
Conka v. Belgium (2002) 34 EHRR 54.23.
Moldovan and Others v. Romania (No. 2), judgment of 12 July 2005.24.
I. Fonseca, Bury Me Standing: The Gypsies and Their Journey (Vintage, 1996); Gadjo Dilo (1997) (directed by Tony Gatlif).25.
Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (the ‘Race
Directive’).
26.
See the EU Network of Experts’ ‘Report on the Situation of Fundamental Rights in the European Union for 2003’, in which they call for
a Romani Integration Directive; available at <http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/index_en.htm>.
27.
See the 2008 released data from the UK Millennium Cohort Study, which strongly suggests that by the age of five, ethnicity appears to
have a significant impact on a child’s health, behaviour and cognitive abilities. All data available at the Centre for Longitudinal Studies
28.
website; <www.cls.ioe.ac.uk/studies.asp?section=000100020001>. Bite-sized analysis at BBC UK blog of 20 October 2008; available via
archive at <www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/markeaston/>.
For example, see the explicit parallel drawn by James Goldston, former ERRC Legal Director and Counsel to the applicants, J. Goldston,
‘European Court to address racism in landmark cases’, Open Society Justice Initiative, 28 February, available at <www.justiceinitiati-
ve.org/db/resources2?res_id=102627>.
29.
Law no. 29/1984, since repealed by Law no. 561/2004, which entered into force on 1 January 2005.30.
Decree no. 127/1997 on specialised schools, since repealed by Decree no. 73/2005, which came into force on 17 February 2005.31.
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Established to cater for children with severe learning
difficulties, special schools in the Czech Republic offered
a severely reduced curriculum, and until a change in the
law in 2000,32 children needed to have completed a normal
primary school in order to continue on to secondary
education. Secondary school and beyond was thus not
available to the children in this case. Their only option
beyond the age of 11 was vocational training.
A central element in the earlier Chamber decision,
characterisation as requiring special schooling took place
following an assessment by educational psychologists of
the intellectual abilities of a given child and the decision
of the respective head-teacher. The parents of a child need
to give their consent according to the law before assign-
ment or transfer to a special school can take place. They
are informed by letter of the decision to place their child
in a special school and of their right to appeal that deci-
sion. The parents of the children in this case had been
sent the required letters and had not appealed the place-
ment decision. It is also possible at any stage to contest
a child’s placement in special schooling, and a number of
the parents in this case had taken advantage of this oppor-
tunity; as a consequence, their children were transferred
into a normal school. The majority of parents chose not
to do so.
3.2. The second chamber’s verdict
The application was lodged with the European Court of
Human Rights in 2000 following an unsuccessful chal-
lenge before the Czech Constitutional Court in 1999.
The decision of the Second Chamber on 7 February 2006
was an extraordinary ruling.33
In line with the Court’s earlier reasoning in the Belgian
Linguistics Case, the principle of equality as enshrined
in Article 14 is breached where a difference in treatment
has no legitimate aim and fails to demonstrate ‘a reason-
able relationship of proportionality’ between that aim
and the means employed.34
The applicants, represented by the European Roma
Rights Center, had argued, applying the Court’s own
test, that there was no ‘reasonable and objective’ justifica-
tion for the statistical findings outlined above. A poor
grasp of the Czech language or socio-economic family
disadvantage could not, so it was argued, constitute rea-
sonable and objective justification for the practice of
condemning children to a vastly inferior education, being
wholly disproportionate to the aim.35 The applicants
further argued that even where the Czech government
could advance a legitimate aim for the practice, the evi-
dence of gross racial disparity as an outcome of the means
employed to achieve that aim could not be considered
proportionate. Moreover, the children of other language
groups (for example, the children of Vietnamese or Polish
families) or of disadvantaged families from other ethnic
groups did not suffer the same disparity in placement,
suggesting that there was no racially neutral explanation
for the statistical difference in treatment between Romani
and non-Romani children.
In response, the Czech government did not attempt to
provide an explanation for the disparity, arguing instead
that the existence of special schools pursued a legitimate
aim, that the decision to place a child in a special school
was taken in the best interests of the child, that it was
done pursuant to a proper procedure administered by
educational professionals and with the consent of the
parents.36
By a 6-1 majority, the second chamber found in favour
of the government. The finding is less surprising than the
reasoning the chamber adopted. The Court accepted the
government’s argument that the special schooling system
was established pursuant to a legitimate aim of enabling
children from all ethnic backgrounds with learning diffi-
culties to obtain a basic education. It was thus not aimed
specifically at Romani children (not a point actually
claimed by the applicants).
In dealing with the seemingly compelling statistical evi-
dence that demonstrated an overwhelming disproportion-
ate effect of the placement mechanism on Romani chil-
dren, and thus with the applicants argument that the
measures adopted were disproportionate, the Court up-
held earlier case-law. In line with its finding in Hugh
Jordan v. UK,37 the Court acknowledged that although
a general policy may have disproportionately prejudicial
effects on a particular group and thus be discriminatory
in principle, statistical evidence was not sufficient on its
own to establish this. Thus, the argument of indirect or
disparate impact discrimination was swept aside.
In considering whether any difference in treatment may
have been the result of prejudice, the Court considered
the nature of the tests. They accepted that the tests were
administered by professional educational psychologists.
The Court held that it was not its role to look beyond
the facts of the case in an attempt to establish that the
individual psychologists involved in the testing of the
applicants had made their decision on the basis of discrim-
inatory attitudes towards Roma. Moreover, it found that
the applicants had not successfully challenged the assess-
ment of the tests and demonstrated that the children in
the case did not in fact have learning disabilities, despite
the Czech government’s own admission in a report to
the body overseeing the Framework Convention for the
Amendment no. 19/2000 to Law no. 29/1984 (‘the Schools Act’), which came into force on 18 February 2000.32.
See for analysis of the first ruling, M.E.A. Goodwin, ‘D.H. and Others v. Czech Republic: a major set-back for the development of non-
discrimination norms in Europe’ (2006) 7 German Law Journal 421.
33.
Case ‘relating to the certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium’ v. Belgium (Belgian Linguistics case), A6,
p. 34, para. 10 (1968). The Court has repeated this test in , inter alia, Marckx v. Belgium, A31, p. 16, para. 33 (1979); Rasmussen v. Denmark,
A87, p. 14, para. 38 (1984) and Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. UK, A42 (1985).
34.
Chamber decision, paras. 38-39.35.
Ibid., para. 34.36.
Op cit., n. 9.37.
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Protection of Minorities that the psychological tests fre-
quently placed Romani children of above average intelli-
gence in special schools because of the culturally specific
nature of the tests.38
As a final aspect of its reasoning, the Chamber put con-
siderable weight upon the fact that a number of the chil-
dren’s parents in the present case had failed to lodge ap-
peals to the decisions to place their children in special
schools; and that where parents of some of the applicants
had done so at a later stage, their children had in fact been
transferred back into the normal school system. It also
took note of the fact that some of the parents in the case
had themselves requested the placement of their children
in a special school. Thus, while finding that a Romani
child’s experience in the Czech education system was ‘by
no means perfect’, the Chamber found that it was first
and foremost the parents’ responsibility – ‘part of their
natural duty’ – to ensure that their children receive an
education.39
As a result of this reasoning, the Chamber felt unable to
conclude that the placement of the applicants in special
schools was the result of racial prejudice. The effect of
this judgement was effectively to deny the existence of
indirect racial discrimination, putting the Strasbourg
Court in direct conflict not only with widely accepted
global norms as enshrined in the various UN Conven-
tions to combat various forms of discrimination, but
more importantly, with European Union obligations
enshrined inter alia in Directive 2000/43 EC. Moreover,
the bench majority opted to blame the parents for any
harm that their children may have suffered as a result of
deeply entrenched systemic discrimination.
3.3. The Grand Chamber’s decision
The Grand Chamber, having examined the question of
exhaustion of domestic remedies in considerable detail,
began by providing a clear contextualisation for their
ruling, laying out what they understood to be the main
principles at play.40 The Court thus took the opportunity
– as the applicants had suggested that they do – to make
a clear statement about its position on non-discrimination
in relation to its earlier case-law. This judgment, then, is
a deliberate and considered opinion of the Court, one it
knew would be widely reported and well studied. That
this case represented a special opportunity for the Court
was thus well understood.
The Court began by recapitulating its standard definition
of discrimination as a difference in treatment between
persons in relevantly similar situations that lacks an ob-
jective and reasonable justification;41 equally, it repeated
its earlier findings in, inter alia, Hugh Jordan v. the UK
that a general policy or measure that has disproportion-
ately prejudicial effects may constitute discrimination
even where the measure is not specifically aimed at the
group concerned.42 Further, following Zarb Adami v.
Malta, a case decided in the interval between the Chamber
verdict and the Grand Chamber hearing, the Court noted
that discrimination in violation of the Convention may
result from a de facto situation i.e. that intent is not re-
quired.43
In terms of the ground at issue, the Court reiterated its
recent line that ‘racial discrimination is a particularly in-
vidious kind of discrimination’ with ‘perilous conse-
quences’. As such, and with the understanding that a
democratic vision of society requires that diversity be
seen not as a threat but as a source of enrichment, member
states are required by the Convention to use ‘all available
means’ to combat racism. Further, the Court reminded
itself of its ruling in Timishev v. Russia (ignored by the
Chamber), in which it held that ‘no difference in treat-
ment which is based exclusively or to a decisive extent
on a person’s ethnic origin is capable of being objectively
justified in a contemporary democratic society’.44
The Court reaffirmed its jurisprudence concerning the
shifting of the burden of proof to the respondent
government to establish an appropriate justification in
situations where prima facie evidence of a Convention
infringement is established. More at issue was the ques-
tion of what constitutes appropriate evidence of a prima
facie violation. In Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria,45 the
Court had already held that there were no procedural
barriers to the admissibility of evidence and that proof
may follow from the ‘co-existence of sufficiently strong,
clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted
presumptions of fact.’46 The Court also emphasised that
it was established case-law that the level of proof or per-
suasion necessary to reach a certain conclusion depended
upon the specificity of the facts and the Convention right
a stake. These statements, taken together with its declara-
tions both in Nachova and Timishev – repeated in the
present case – of the evil of racial discrimination, suggest
that the Court is willing to lower the barrier to establish-
ing a prima facie case where the allegation is one of racial
discrimination; nevertheless, it did not make this explicit.
However, it was the use of statistics that was primarily
at issue in the present case. In two decisions, one decided
Report submitted 1 April 1999 pursuant to Article 25(1) of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities;
Chamber judgment, para. 26.
38.
Chamber judgment, paras. 51-52.39.
Paras. 175-181.40.
E.g. Willis v. UK, no. 36042/97, ECHR 2002-IV, para 48.41.
Hugh Jordan v. UK, paras. 105-109.42.
Zarb Adami v. Malta, judgment of 20 June 2006, para. 76. This ruling represents an explicit acknowledgment by a different section of the
Chamber court (fourth section), in line with Hugh Jordan, of the existence of indirect discrimination, and could be read as a response to
the decision of the second section in D.H. and Others.
43.
D.H. and Others, decision 13 November 2007, para 176; Timishev v. Russia, judgment of 13 December 2005, [2005] ECHR 858.44.
Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria, both chamber and Grand Chamber decisions.45.
D.H. and Others, GC, para. 178.46.
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in the interval between the two rulings, the afore-men-
tioned Zarb Adami and Hoogendijk v. the Netherlands,47
the Court had already overturned its own earlier decision
as to the inadmissibility of statistical evidence.
In applying the above cited principles to the facts of the
case at hand, the Grand Chamber went further and found
that where the allegation is one of indirect discrimination,
effective protection of the rights contained in the Conven-
tion requires that less strict evidential rules should apply.
The Court is not clear on what the standard is against
which the evidentiary barrier is to be lowered but appears
to imply from the subsequent paragraphs that lowering
the barrier refers to the acceptance of statistical data. In
its reasoning, the Grand Chamber allowed that statistics
that proved to be ‘reliable and significant’ were sufficient
to constitute prima facie evidence, and went on to find
the statistics presented by the applicants met that
standard. It should be noted that they were also uncon-
tested in the present case, although it seems unlikely that
the Court, albeit that it noted the fact that the Govern-
ment had failed to contest the figures given, is developing
a three-pronged test of reliable, significant and uncontest-
ed, although the latter may well come to influence deter-
mination of whether given statistics are reliable.
Following a shift of the burden of proof, the Court
moved on to whether an objective and reasonable justifi-
cation of the difference in treatment existed, noting that
where the difference of treatment concerned race, colour
or ethnic origin, the possible justifications will be inter-
preted as strictly as possible.48
The Court found, contra to the second section, that the
system of psychological testing could not provide objec-
tive and reasonable justification. In this, the Court took
specific note of the Czech government’s own admission
that Romani children of above intelligence were often
placed in special schools because they failed to take the
specific circumstances of Romani children into consider-
ation. It also appeared to place weight on the submission
of third-party interveners and reports from European
observers that the outcome of the psychological testing
– i.e. the placement of Romani children in special schools
by overwhelming margins – was ‘quasi-automatic’ and
reflected the racial prejudices of society.49 Further, the
Court highlighted the lack of safeguards attending the
schooling arrangements of Romani children reflecting
the failure to pay sufficient attention to their special needs
as members of a disadvantaged group, in effect linking
back to earlier findings under Article 8 that governments
have special responsibilities towards Romani communi-
ties.50
However, in order to overturn the section’s judgment
convincingly, the Grand Chamber needed to address the
more awkward issue of whether parental consent provid-
ed justification. In coming to an opinion, the Court took
note of the European Commission against Racism and
Intolerance’s opinion that Romani parents often consent
to the channelling of their children into special schools
in part in order to avoid abuse from non-Romani children
and as a consequence of the continuing low degree of
understanding of the long-term negative consequences
of sending their children to such schools.51 Yet, what the
Court did instead was conclude that it was not satisfied
that the parents in this case, themselves poorly educated
and as members of a disadvantaged minority, were capa-
ble of weighing up all the particulars of the situation. As
consent in this situation could not be considered in-
formed, as not given in full view of all the facts and con-
sequences of the decision, it was not capable of waiving
the applicants’ rights.52 Ultimately, the parents were
deemed incapable of giving their consent. The majority
went on to find that the prohibition of racial discrimina-
tion was of such fundamental public importance that it
would in any case not accept any waiver of the right not
to be subject to racial discrimination.
In sum, the Grand Chamber found that the difference in
treatment between Romani and non-Romani children
was neither objectively justified nor proportionate in
terms of the aims pursued and the means used. There
were, however, four angry dissents that will be considered
in the analysis below.
3.4. Analysis
In contrast with the Chamber’s judgement of a mere 12
pages, the Grand Chamber’s ruling stretches to a total of
61 pages. Although it would be too much on the basis of
the number of pages alone to draw strong conclusions as
to the seriousness with which the Court went at their
task, there are other indications to suggest that the Court
saw this case as being of vital importance in defining the
Court and its purpose. While length is no test of quality,
the Court felt the need to be very thorough. It heard third
party interventions from Interights, Human Rights
Watch, Minority Rights Group International, the Euro-
pean Network against Racism, the European Roma Infor-
mation Office, International Step by Step Association,
the Roma Education Fund, the European Early Child-
hood Education Research Association, and the Fédération
internationale des ligues des droits de l’Homme. It took
Hoogendijk v. the Netherlands, op. cit. n. 34.47.
D.H. and Others, GC, para. 196.48.
Ibid., para. 200. The 2000 report by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) called the placement of Romani
children in special schools ‘quasi-automatic’, para. 42. Similarly, the Court noted the report by the Commissioner for Human Rights,




D.H. and Others, decision 13 November 2007, para 203-204.52.
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itself not just through Czech legislation, but went in detail
in to Council of Europe instruments,53 European Com-
munity instruments and case-law,54 what it called ‘Rele-
vant United Nations Materials’,55 and other ‘relevant
material’,56 some of which it quoted at length. The out-
raged reaction to the parochialism of the chamber deci-
sion apparently moved the wider Court to demonstrate
its learning.
The finding itself was not a surprise, in part because it
followed the line of established case-law; arguably it was
the Chamber that had taken a very narrow view. The
2006 judgment already seemed out of keeping then with
the movement of the Court in giving more shape to Arti-
cle 14. The reaffirmation of the shift on the use of statis-
tical evidence places the Court fully in line with Luxem-
bourg jurisprudence, even down to the explicit caveat
that statistics, although accepted as evidence, are not
necessary to meet the prima facie burden.57 Yet, in decid-
ing that statistics given as evidence of a breach must be
‘reliable and significant’ in order to activate the burden
of proof shifting, the Court gives no guidance on what
‘significant’ might entail, only suggesting that it will de-
pend upon the facts of the case and the importance of the
right claimed. While the endorsement of the statistical
evidence in D.H. and Others suggests that the barrier
will not be high for cases involving racial discrimination
– these statistics after all being generated from an NGO-
compiled and distributed questionnaire, the same NGO
as was acting for the applicants –, it is possible that a re-
strictive interpretation of ‘significant’ could become a
new barrier for success in these types of cases.
Moreover, while the decision itself can only be welcomed,
there are serious criticisms that can be levelled at the
Grand Chamber’s reasoning. Although a number can be
made, such as the failure of the Court to examine
whether the practice in fact constituted direct discrimina-
tion following the government’s admission that the tests
were not culturally neutral,58 this analysis will focus on
what the present author considers the most important in
relation to judging the historical significance of the ruling.
3.4.1. An abandoning of the individual
The first significant criticism was highlighted by the dis-
senters on the bench, in particular in the dissent of Judge
Jungwiert, but also in that of Judge Borrego Borrego. In
explicitly avoiding the question of whether the individual
applicants actually required special schooling on account
of their individual abilities and/ or learning difficulties,
the Court relied for its finding on the statistical evidence
that demonstrated that Romani children were placed in
special schools by overwhelming margins; that is, it ig-
nored the circumstances of the individuals and, in the
words of Judge Jungwiert, ‘set about evaluating and criti-
cising a country’s entire education system’.59 The Court
has long held that, as a supranational institution, it is not
best placed to carry out fact-finding but must rely on the
superior ability of the national courts to fulfil this role.60
Indeed in this particular judgment, the Grand Chamber
reminded itself of this self-imposed limitation and its
need to focus on the individual applicants and not the
overall social context, a task it judged better left to the
Czech Constitutional Court.61 However, large sections
of the judgment are in fact devoted to an assessment of
the social context of the applications, from attempts to
lay out the historical background of Roma in Europe –
Recommendation No. R (2000) 4 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the education of Roma/Gypsy children in Europe
(adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 3 February 2000 at the 69th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies, and its Appendix; Parliamen-
53.
tary Assembly Recommendation no. 1203 (1993) on Gypsies in Europe; Parliamentary Recommendation no. 1557 (2002): The legal situ-
ation of Roma in Europe; European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) general policy recommendation no. 3: Combating
racism and intolerance against Roma/Gypsies (1998); ECRI general policy recommendation no. 7 on national legislation to combat racism
and racial discrimination (2002); ECRI’s report on the Czech Republic from 1997, 2000 and 2004; the Framework Convention for the
Protection of National Minorities, as well as the report submitted by the Czech Republic in 2004 and the Advisory Committee’s Opinion
of 2002 and 2005; finally, the Final Report of the Commissioner for Human Rights on the Human-Rights Situation of thee Roma, Sinti
and Travellers in Europe (2006).
Article 13; Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination; Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June
2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin; Case 152-73, Giovanni Maria
54.
Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost, 12 February 1974; Case 170-84 Bilka Kaufhaus v. Karin Weber von Hartz, 13 May 1986; C-167/97 Regina
v. Secretary of State for Employment, ex parte Nicole Seymour-Smith and Laura Perez, 9 February 1999; C-5/02 Hilde Schönheit v. Stadt
Frankfurt am Main/Silvia Becker v. Land Hessen, 23 October 2003; C-256/01 Debra Allonby v. Accrington & Rossendale College and
Others, 13 January 2004; C-147/03 Commission v. Austria, 7 July 2005.
ICCPR and General Comment 18 from the Human Rights Committee as well as their Communication regarding the Czech Republic of
1995; ICERD and its Committee’s General Recommendation 14, 19, and 27, as well as it’s concluding observations on the Czech Republic
55.
of 1998; CRC; the UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination in Education; and the Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice adopted
by the UNESCO General Conference of 27 November 1978.
Information from the website of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on the Czech Republic; the House of Lords decision
in Regina v. Immigration Office at Prague Airport and another, ex parte ERRC and others; and US Supreme Court’s ruling in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
56.
In O’Flynn, the ECJ rejected the UK government’s contention that statistics were necessary to establish any case of indirect discrimination.
O’Flynn C-237/94 [1996] ECR I-02617, para. 21; also D.H. and Others, GC, para. 188.
57.
For further development of this line, see Lilla Farkas, ‘The Scene After Battle: What is the Victory in D.H. Worth and Where to Go From
Here?’ (2008) 1 Roma Rights Journal 51.
58.
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Jungwiert, para. 2.59.
See Handyside v. the UK A24 (1976), paras 48-49; also Engel v. the Netherlands A22 (1976), para. 22. For consideration of the broader
doctrine of the margin of appreciation of which this forms part, see D.J. Harris, M. O’Boyle and C. Warbrick, Law of the European
Convention on Human Rights (Butterworths, 1995), 12-15.
60.
Grand Chamber ruling, para. 45.61.
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a much contested subject among academics, despite the
official endorsement of the thesis of Indian origins62 –,
to examinations of a wide range of international and
European monitoring bodies. Such delving into the his-
torical and contemporary situation of Romani communi-
ties brought the Court to the assessment that, ‘as a result
of their turbulent history and constant uprooting the
Roma have become a specific type of disadvantaged and
vulnerable minority’.63 This assessment led to the some-
what startling conclusion for a Court, that because the
practice of special schools had ‘a disproportionately
prejudicial effect on the Roma community … it does not
need to examine their [the applicants’] individual cases’.64
The danger with the Court’s decision to abandon a judi-
cial role is that it risks turning itself into, as Judge Borrego
Borrego commented, a second European Commission
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), or any other of
the many monitoring bodies that examine the social
context of racism and the well-being of minority groups
within Europe. The obvious point is that the Court is
indeed – as it has always highlighted itself – not best
placed to carry out social assessments of the extent of
marginalisation or deprivation of given minorities or,
more broadly put, the facts of given cases; it does not
have the time or the capacity to weigh up controversial
historical and sociological evidence and reach nuanced
conclusions. The reports upon which the Court relied
are frequently based upon second or third hand informa-
tion and are very general in nature, often reporting on
the situation in ‘Central and Eastern Europe’ or in
‘Europe’ as a whole. These reports do not allow the Court
to make an assessment of the situation in the Czech Re-
public at the time period covered by the applications with
any degree of accuracy; nor do they tell the Court any-
thing about the situation of the given applicants.
And yet, if the Court is to develop a fuller and more
context-based approach to difference in treatment, it
needs to make some kind of assessment of the particular
and separate needs of a given group (to which the appli-
cant belongs) in order to determine whether treating like
alike itself constitutes discrimination in that particular
case. Where this is a minority group, assessment of
whether and what particular needs exist and pertain to
the situation will require some sort of historical, cultural
and sociological examination. Given that, Judge Borrego
Borrego’s dissent misses its target. However, in attempt-
ing to demonstrate how aware it was of the problems
facing Romani communities and how much it really did
care, despite the impression given by the Second Section,
the Court made itself a hostage to the details.65 In future,
it would be advisable to minimise the extent to which it
delves into such issues, and unless information is strictly
relevant to understanding the situation from which the
application stems, one can only think that the Court
would be better off to exclude it from its formal reason-
ing.
However, there is a more fundamental criticism of the
Court’s explicit abandoning of its judicial role and that
concerns the denial of individual justice.66 In dismissing
the need to consider the individual applicants, the Court
is clearly stating that it could have be any Romani child
as applicant and the finding would have been the same.
The outcome of such a dismissal is similar to that of the
Czech schooling system: the failure to see the individual
child in all his or her glory, his or her particular needs,
and to lump all together on the basis of their ethnicity.
This is not to say that the Court should have taken the
step of arranging alternative psychological testing of each
applicant in order to determine whether or not they were
correctly placed in a special school but to note that the
Court appeared to have been a little carried away in its
own momentum to the point where it explicitly denied
the individual’s relevance in the proceedings.
Moreover, the failure of the GC to see the individual
child is accentuated by the complete absence in the
Court’s reasoning of the harm done to misplaced children
who pass through the special schooling system. Nowhere
in the judgement proper did the Court consider the con-
sequences of the vastly inferior education on offer for
the life chances of the children affected, and hence their
ability to play a meaningful role in the social and econom-
ic life of society; nor did the Court consider the irrepara-
ble psychological harm that is likely to result from
branding young children as mentally deficient or the
harm that results from the failure to create a multi-cultur-
al environment in which all children can learn to live to-
gether. The only point at which the Court appears to
consider the claims of the applicants’ lawyers of ‘educa-
tional, psychological and emotional harm’ is in deciding
the amount of non-pecuniary damages it will award each
applicant. The Court held that it was ‘clear’ that the
children had sustained non-pecuniary damage for the
frustration and humiliation of the discrimination that
they had faced, and decided to award EUR 4000 per child.
Even considering just the loss of future earnings that re-
sults from the derisory education suffered, the amount
See in this regard, A. Fraser, The Gypsies. Oxford: Blackstone Press, 1992 (still the best introduction); but also L. Lucassen, W. Willems
and A. Cottaar (eds.), Gypsies and Other Itinerant Groups. Great Britain: Macmillian, 1998; and W. Willems, In Search of the True Gypsy.
From Enlightenment to Final Solution. London: Frank Cass, 1997.
62.
Grand Chamber decision, para. 182 (also cited by Judge Borrego Borrego in his dissent, para. 5).63.
Ibid., para. 209.64.
For example, Judge Jungwiert’s criticism that the historical information upon which the Court relied was ‘inaccurate, inadequate and of
a very general nature’ (para. 3); for example, he highlights the Court’s hedging on the Romani experience during the Nazi occupation of
65.
what are now the Czech territories, describing it as an ‘attempted extermination’, whereas historical records show it to have been an almost
total annihilation (para. 4).
Another discussion has taken place on this point on a Czech specialist internet server ‘Different Law’, concerning whether or not the
government would have been able to rebut the presumption of discrimination by demonstrating that one of the children was in fact
66.
mentally disabled. See David Strupek, ‘Before and After the Ostrava Case: Lessons for Anti-Discrimination Law and Litigation in the
Czech Republic’ (2008) 1 Roma Rights Journal 41. Strupek represented the applicants in the case.
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of EUR 4000 seems woeful. The applicants’ lawyers, in
contrast, received EUR 10,000 for their time and ex-
penses.67
The failure to deal adequately with the harm to the indi-
vidual child that results both from a woefully inferior
education and from the fact of racial segregation itself
sees the Court unwilling to label the consequences of
such systemic discrimination as segregation and to con-
demn it. In a case concerning the de facto segregation of
ethnic minority children into schools for the mentally
inferior, the word segregation is not even mentioned once.
The Court denied itself the opportunity to echo the US
Supreme Court in declaring that segregation per se is in-
vidiously evil.
3.4.2. The issue of consent
A further criticism concerns the Court’s characterisation
of Romani parents in dealing with the issue of consent.
In attempting to sidestep the thorny detail that the appli-
cants’ parents had consented to their placement in a spe-
cial school, the Court decided that instead of blaming the
parents it would excuse them on grounds of incapacity.
The Court noted that because the parents were ‘members
of a disadvantaged community and often poorly educat-
ed’, it was not satisfied that they ‘were capable of weigh-
ing up all the aspects of the situation’ and the conse-
quences thereof.68 There are a number of dangers with
this approach. The first is that it appears to assume that
no Romani parents are capable of deciding what is in
their child’s best interest; the best interests of a child are
not a neutral given but are culturally specific and there
are real dangers to the Court assuming that it can fulfil
that role in place of the parents. Secondly, the assumption
of incapacity of the parents can be seen as feeding into
and sustaining a paternalistic attitude towards Roma and
thus is arguably part and parcel of the discrimination that
the Court so readily condemns. Moreover, it is of a simi-
lar type of argument as that which saw thousands of mi-
nority children removed from their parents in many
countries around the world, whether aboriginal children
taken from their families in Canada and Australia, or the
common policy of removing Romani children under
Communism in many of the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe.
Further, the Court went on to state that in any case, the
parents were not capable of waiving the right not to be
subject to racial discrimination on behalf of their child;
the public interest in tackling racial discrimination thus
outweighed the parents right to take decisions on behalf
of their child. While the recognition of the destructive
power of racial discrimination to the fabric of society is
again to be welcomed, and while not denying the difficul-
ty of fashioning a foolproof argument that recognises the
public interest in such cases, there is something worri-
some in the Court’s apparent approach that we all know
racial discrimination when we see it, at which moments
consent of the alleged victim becomes irrelevant. Diagnos-
ing discrimination is not always so straight-forward.
One simple and uncontroversial way to approach the is-
sue of parental consent would have been to assert that a
child’s right to education is so fundamental that it cannot
be waived by parental consent.69 Moreover this approach
would have allowed the Court to stress not only the vital
importance of education but the importance of a multi-
cultural education as the foundation of our increasingly
diverse societies.
Alternatively, the Court could of noted the choices that
Romani parents are too frequently faced with: that of
sending their children through the gauntlet of a normal
school system that is rife with anti-Romani prejudice and
harassment from fellow pupils, other parents and teachers,
or of ensuring that their child at least had a safe environ-
ment in which to learn the basics of an education. Simi-
larly, special schools can be attractive to Romani parents,
where the schools are residential institutions, for the hot
meals and accommodation that they provide, and which
the normal school system does not. Thus, parents who
consent to send their children to special school may make
the choice to provide their children with shelter and a
warm meal that they are themselves unable to provide.
Had the Court chosen to focus on the terrible dilemma
facing many Romani parents, between that of security
and sustenance for their children and a normal education,
the Court could have highlighted the multi-faceted nature
of exclusion that Romani communities face; and in so
doing acknowledge the often impossible choice given
Romani parents by the very systemic discrimination that
the case was challenging.
But instead of powerful statements on the vital impor-
tance of an education of equality among their peers drawn
from all the groups that make up society, the Court
chose to rule that parents of marginalized minority
groups are incapable of giving consent. Where Brown v.
Board’s vision of the place of all children, regardless of
race, in American society is empowering, the Court in
D.H. and Others is at risk of infantilizing all Romani
parents in a broad and sweeping denial of their ability to
be proper parents.
In sum, the Court failed to deliver a judgment of the
moral stature of Brown v. Board of Education precisely
because it took too great a leap into a contextual approach
to understanding differential treatment – necessary in
order to move towards meaningful equality and hence
to be welcomed; yet in doing so, it appeared to lose sight
of the individual applicants stood before it asking for
justice. In order to have risen to the moral significance
of the Supreme Court’s ruling in 1954, the European
Court needed to have focused on the individual, explicitly
Although the Court traditionally does not award high damages – deeming judgment to be satisfaction enough – for the sake of comparison,
it recently awarded an 85-year old man 30,000 euros in non-pecuniary damages for the suffering inflicted in a prosecution for alleged war
crimes dating from the Second World War, in violation of Article 7. Kononov v. Latvia, judgment of 24 July 2008.
67.
Grand Chamber ruling, para. 203.68.
See Goodwin, op. cit. n. 26.69.
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seeing the individual child – their thwarted hopes, desires
and potentialities – as well as the importance of that child
to her own community and the wider society. The Court
needed to have stressed the value of education in achiev-
ing the diverse democratic society that the Convention
is charged with protecting and fulfilling, and hence of
educational segregation as one of the most harmful
practices at work in Europe today. It did none of these
things.
4. The follow-up cases
The Court was given the opportunity to follow up on
D.H. and Others as cases already in the pipeline looked
to benefit from that enthusiastic decision. Sampanis and
Others v. Greece,70 decided on 15th June 2008, concerned
first the failure of local school authorities to enrol Romani
children at two primary schools and the subsequent deci-
sion to place those children in separate facilities following
sustained protests from non-Romani parents against the
placement of Romani children in classes alongside their
children. A month later, in Oršuš and Others v. Croatia,71
the applicants brought a claim more straightforwardly
similar to that in Ostrava, namely that Romani children
were segregated from the mainstream, in this case into
separate classes within the normal school system on their
basis of their ethnicity.
The ruling in Sampanis is available only in French, an
odd fact given the importance of the subject matter.
There were two issues at stake in this case: the first, the
failure by school headteachers to enrol the applicants for
the school year 2004-2005 despite attempts by their par-
ents to do so; and secondly, the creation of preparatory
classes solely for Romani children in separate facilities
within the school premises. On the first issue, the Court
took the opportunity again to elaborate on the positive
obligations of the state towards a vulnerable group such
as the Roma. Although the authorities had not explicitly
refused to enrol Romani children, the obligation was on
the state – even where, as was the government’s explana-
tion, the authorities believed that the parents were only
seeking information about enrolment and not actually
seeking to enrol the children – to give ‘particular attention
to their needs’ and to facilitate the children’s enrolment.
Thus, Article 14 requires state parties to recognise the
needs of members of vulnerable communities, by which
they should, in practice, treat such individuals differently.
As regards the second issue of separate classes, the Court
considered in detail the government’s claim that the
classes were necessary to prepare Romani pupils, because
of their having missed a year of school, to enter ordinary
classes. Separating out the fact of separate classes from
the demonstrations by non-Romani parents that preceded
their establishment, the Court highlighted that the
government had not put forward any examples of chil-
dren, in the two years in which the applicants were taught
in separate classes, who were subsequently admitted into
the ordinary class system. Moreover, there appeared to
be no formal system of assessment in order to establish
on an objective basis the ability of these children to follow
the ordinary class curriculum. This alone was sufficient
for the Chamber to find a violation of Article 14 in con-
junction with Article 2 Protocol No. 1.
More importantly for the present assessment, in stressing
the importance of an appropriate system capable of assess-
ing objectively the capabilities of children and of moni-
toring their progress, the Court emphasised the impor-
tance of the appearance of objectivity in cases where
those affected are children of ethnic minorities. The sug-
gestion that state parties should seek to avoid that chil-
dren and their parents understand their separation from
the mainstream as being the result of racial prejudice in-
dicates an awareness of the psychological harm resulting
from segregation – an issue barely touched upon by the
Court in Ostrava. Yet in doing so here, the Court links
the need to avoid the appearance of segregation to the
racist actions of the non-Romani parents. This linking
means that it is not clear whether, in the absence of racial-
ly prejudicial actions by any of the actors involved in the
factual situation forming the basis of the case, the Court
would consider the psychological element as relevant i.e.
unless there was good reason for those affected to believe
the differential treatment that they receive to be racially-
motivated, the Court would not give weight to it. Only
further case-law will tell.
Yet, despite again finding in the applicant’s favour, the
Court avoided making a comprehensive statement con-
demning segregation. Moreover, it failed to follow
through on its recognition of the psychological impact
of segregation and establish as principle that it is not the
quality of the alternative curriculum or the state of up-
keep of the separate school buildings but the impact of
separation itself on the minds of the children – both mi-
nority and majority – that makes segregation so awful,
despite an excellent opportunity to do so.
Moreover, the Court unfortunately repeated the Grand
Chamber’s finding in Ostrava, that the consent of the
parents – again, as ‘members of an underprivileged and
often uneducated community’ – to the placement of their
children in separate classes was invalid, as they would
not have been able to assess all the aspects of the situation
and the consequences thereof.
The case of Oršuš saw the Court give content to what an
objective assessment system might look like. The Court
expressly rejected the applicants’ claim of a parallel be-
tween their situation and that of the children from Ostra-
va, accepting instead that a lack of sufficient knowledge
of the Croatian language by the applicants constituted
an objective justification. Moreover, the decision of the
authorities to place the separate classes within the ordi-
nary schooling system and to facilitate transfer of children
from the separate classes to the normal mixed classes
meant their actions fell within the bounds of proportion-
ality; in contrast to the Greek authorities, the Croatian
Sampanis v. Greece, judgment of 15 June 2008.70.
Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, judgment of 17th July 2008; referred to the Grand Chamber on 1 December 2008.71.
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government provided evidence of the regular transfer of
children from a separate class to the mainstream. The
decision of the Court to accept the government’s justifi-
cations came despite the fact that the applicants’ language
ability was not assessed upon enrolment and despite the
lack of established criteria for assessing when a child
should be transferred into the mainstream, with the sys-
tem relying entirely upon the judgment of individual
teachers.72
The difficulty with accepting insufficiency in the language
of instruction as justification for a difference in treatment
– even where assessment is objective and transferral pos-
sible – is that it again fails to address the issue of separa-
tion as an evil in itself. The Court did not deny that the
system affected Romani children overwhelmingly, al-
though it did note that in the three schools at issue only
73%, 36% and 26% of Romani pupils at those schools
were placed in separate classes,73 and it appears to mention
in passing that the existence of separate classes occurs
only in four of the elementary schools in the entire region,
because it is an area of high Romani concentration. The
evidence does appear to suggest that separate classes were
created especially for Romani children.
Oršuš is interesting in addition because the applicants
endeavoured to force the Court to address the issue of
psychological harm. By making a claim under Article 3,
the applicants attempted to make the case that although
they were not condemned to schools for the mentally-
disabled, were not placed in special classes by ethnically
significant margins, and, moreover, accepting the assess-
ment of the deficiency of their Croatian, the fact of sepa-
ration itself for the children concerned was so harmful
that it engaged the liability of the State. The applicants
claimed that segregation from non-Romani children
constituted inhuman and degrading treatment because
of the educational, emotional and psychological harm
that it caused. To make their case, the applicants submit-
ted a report of a psychological study of children in Roma-
only classes from a county in Croatia that stated conclu-
sively that the placement of children in segregated classes,
whatever the purpose for doing so, led to feelings of lower
self-esteem, of self-respect and caused problems in the
development of the children’s identity; in addition, the
report found that the children themselves stated by an
overwhelming margin that they did not wish to be sepa-
rated from non-Romani children, that they did not have
any non-Romani friends, would like to, and that they
felt unaccepted in the school environment.74
The applicants were unsuccessful. In response, the Court
noted that although it did not rule out that discriminatory
segregation in the field of education could cross the
threshold of Article 3 – not a move of any significance
given the Court’s earlier findings that racial discrimina-
tion can and has breached Article 375 – no evidence had
been presented to suggest that separation in a special class
had caused any harm to any of the individual applicants.
Whereas in D.H., the Grand Chamber opted to focus
not on the individual applicants but on the system as a
whole, in Oršuš, the Court’s assessment of the impact
and needs of the applicants in the case at hand takes centre
stage. Oršuš thus appears to be a retreat from the excesses
of D.H. and Others.
The cases of Sampanis and Oršuš sees the Court strug-
gling with the implications of systemic discrimination
and the extent to which it can be expected to provide a
remedy against a general claim against the system. The
rulings suggest that the Court is moving towards a set of
standards that any system of education that separates
ethnic minority children from the mainstream must meet;
and it is not a particularly rigorous one. It does not re-
quire, for example, clearly defined standards or guidelines
for when a child has met the threshold for transferral to
the mainstream but is willing to accept the discretionary
judgment of individual teachers; it does not require that
all efforts be made to house separate classes, where they
are shown to be necessary, in the same physical space as
ordinary classes in order to minimise the impact on the
multicultural atmosphere and on the psychological well-
being of those children separated out from the main-
stream. Indeed, the Court remains apparently uncon-
vinced that separation or segregation into Roma-only
classes causes psychological harm per se.
5. Conclusions
This paper began by asking whether the Grand Cham-
ber’s ruling in D.H. and Others constituted a Brown v.
Board of Education moment for the Strasbourg Court.
The short answer is that the Court fell short of greatness,
but not for want of trying or for a failure to recognise
the significance of the opportunity presented to them.
This of course makes their falling short all the more dis-
appointing once the initial euphoria of the finding had
faded. However, the Court did at last bring their jurispru-
dence into line with that of the European Court of Justice,
weaving together a single European normative frame-
work, and with international non-discrimination norms.
This is no small step and that the Court has at last done
so is hugely to be welcomed. It is to be hoped that the
Court does not allow the ECJ to advance ahead of it again
into difficult terrain. Moreover, the effort the Court made
to contextualise the claims before it goes a long way to-
wards acknowledging the societal responsibility we bear
within our own national settings for the continuing exclu-
sion of Romani communities. That this has been done
by various monitoring bodies at both the European and
international level does not detract from the significance
of the Court adding its powerful voice to the chorus. The
realisation of our collective responsibility is necessary if
we are to be able to move towards meaningful equality
For a case comment by the ERRC lawyer responsible for the case, Anita Danka, ‘The European Court of Human Rights Missed the
Opportunity to Recognise that Segregation in Education can also take place in Mainstream Schools’ (2008) 1 Roma Rights Journal 75.
72.
Oršuš and others v. Croatia, para. 67.73.
Oršuš and others v. Croatia, para. 22.74.
E.g. in the East African Asians case, op. cit. n. 2.75.
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and prevent the patterns of discrimination and exclusion
from being always repeated.
And yet, the authority of the Grand Chamber’s ruling
appears to have set the Court on a particular path, one
in which the Court engages with laying out the limits
within which governments can operate in separating out
pupils from one another on racial lines without having
acknowledged the implicit dangers inherent in such sep-
aration. This is important because the cases discussed in
this article touch upon essential issues beyond the ethnic
community directly affected, such as that of how increas-
ingly multicultural societies can organise a schooling
system that meets the needs of all. The issue of organising
education in an increasingly multicultural Europe, in
which children appear to diverge significantly on ability
along ethnic lines already by entry to the schooling sys-
tem, suggests that a clear understanding of these dangers
and how to balance the needs of certain groups without
damaging the self-esteem of already vulnerable children.
The protests by the non-Romani parents and the incidents
of racist behaviour by those parents towards Romani
children entering the school in Sampanis suggest how
difficult de-segregation can be for even willing govern-
ments. Yet this connection back to the broader prejudicial
attitude of society is the reason why the Court needed
to make a strong and ambiguous statement condemning
segregation. It is the role of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights to elucidate and promulgate shared values
and principles, helping us define who and what we are
as Europeans. That the Court was unwilling to condemn
racial segregation in education does not say good things
about who we Europeans are. What was to be expected
from the Court is a statement of the fundamental impor-
tance of every child and of the vital importance of
equality in access to education in giving meaning to that
statement.
The Grand Chamber’s judgment is thus ultimately disap-
pointing. On the one hand, the Court has gone to great
lengths in its desire to excoriate the shame of the Cham-
ber decision and find for the applicants. Yet on the other,
the clumsy manner in which it did so saw the opportunity
to condemn segregation missed. Moreover, in getting
carried away in the need to make a strong declaration of
principle, the Court made the wrong statement: they de-
valued the individual and infantilized the parents. The
over-turning of the Chamber decision, while welcome,
has thus not been without its costs.
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